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BOOK REVIEW

Steven F. Friedell**
Anyone who has taught Jewish law in an American law
school has probably encountered a well-meaning colleague or
student who has asked something like the following: 'Why
should I study Jewish law? Isn't it all just a lot of formalism
and legalism? Other than as a n historical oddity, what interest
can it have?" For a long time people have had the misconception that Jewish law is overly formal, that it gives slavish
obedience to the letter of the law, and that it is oblivious to
practical consequences. This misconception can be fostered by
reading excerpts from the Talmud that appear to discuss
matters of intense personal pain and anguish in abstract legal
terms.' The misconception of Jewish law is so ingrained in
secular society that it is doubtful that the publication of any
one book or article will remove it. But a start has to be made,
and Professor Aaron Kirschenbaum's two recent books on
Jewish law are a ready antidote for anyone who thinks Jewish
law is only a set of formal rules.2
With Professor Kirschenbaum's books as the foundation
and starting point of my discussion on equity i n Jewish law,
Part I of this review discusses how Jewish law used equity to
govern particular cases. I suggest that the view of Jewish law
* Aaron Kirschenbaum is a Professor of Law a t Tel Aviv University School
of Law. BA. 1946, Brooklyn College; D.H.L. 1967, Jewish Theological Seminary;
Ph.D. 1969, Columbia University.
** Professor of Law, Rutgers University (Camden). B.A., 1971, Brandeis
University; J.D., 1974, The University of Michigan.
1. See JUDITH
PLASKOW,STANDINGAGAIN AT SINAI: JUDAISM
FROM A
FEMINISTPERSPECTIVE
68-70 (1990).
2. AARONKIRSCHENBAUM,
EQUITYIN JEWISH
LAW, HALAKHIC
PERSPECTIVES
IN LAW: FORMALISM
AND FLEXIBILITY IN JEWISH
CML LAW, KTAV Publishing
HALAKHIc PERSPECTIVES];
House, 1991, 324 pp. $35 [hereinafker KIRSCHENBAUM,
AARON KIRSCHENBAUM,
EQUITY IN JEWISH
LAW, BEYONDEQUITY: HALAKHIC
ASPIRATIONISM
IN JEWISH
CML LAW,KTAV Publishing House, 1991, 238 pp. $35
[hereinafter KIRSCHENBAUM,
BEYONDEQUITY].

910

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [I993

as formalistic is based in part on a confusion of the study of
Jewish law as a religious discipline with the application of that
law in actual cases. Part I1 discusses some implications that
result from a n understanding that Jewish law as it was
practiced was a religious legal system with its own set of
values. By comparing the differing goals and values of Jewish
law with those of American law, I will demonstrate that Jewish
legal rules are not likely to be acceptable to modern societies.
Similarly I will discuss why the current Israeli method of
incorporating only "mishpat ivri" (the non-religious aspects of
Jewish law such as torts and contracts) into the Israeli legal
system is fundamentally flawed. The effort to incorporate only
secular aspects of Jewish law into the law of Israel is not likely
to present an accurate application of Jewish law because such
incorporation will take these rules out of context.

I n his books, Professor Kirschenbaum marshals a n
impressive array of talmudic3 and post-talmudic sources,
codes, commentaries, responsa, and writings on philosophy,
religion, and mysticism. If the only achievement of these two
books were to present the reader with this array of fascinating
texts it would be enough. But the books also present a variety
of equitable methods used by the rabbis to do justice in
individual cases. These methods included interpretation,
compromise, a tailoring of justice to the individual case and to
the individual litigants, and a n aspiration to assume greater
obligations than strict law would require.
Beginning with a description of equity in Greek philosophy
and Roman and English law, Professor Kirschenbaum
demonstrates that although Jewish law has no exact equivalent
to the concept of equity found in these other systems, there are
several parallels. The Jewish concepts of "yosher"
(uprightness), "darkhei no'am" (ways of pleasantness), ''lifnim
mishurat hadin" (above and beyond the letter of the law),
3. The Talmud is defined as "[tlhe collection of ancient Rabbinic writings
consisting of the Mishnah and the Gemara, constituting the basis of religious
HERITAGE
DICTIONARY
1313 (2d
authority for traditional Judaism." THE AMERICAN
ed. 1973). Actually, there are two Talmuds. One was compiled in Babylonia-the
Babylonian Talmud, and one was compiled in Palestine-the 'Western" or
N . DORFT& ARTHURROSm, A LIVING
"Jerusalem" Talmud. See generally ELLIOT
OF JEWISHLAW143-44 (1988); ADIN STEINSALIZ,
TREE:THE ROOTSAND GROWTH
THEESSENTIAL
TALMUD
40-63 (Chaya Galai trans., 1976).
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"middat hassidut" (saintliness), and other related concepts
combine to create for the judges and the community a culture
of responsibility and care that goes beyond the requirements of
strict law. Kirschenbaum's books show the development of
these and related equitable concepts in Jewish law and
demonstrate their use in legal materials from talmudic times
until the present.
Professor Kirschenbaum answers the colleague or student
who misunderstands the nature of Jewish law by making the
distinction between the formalism of the study of Jewish law
and its more equitable practice in actual cases. Kirschenbaum
points out that the study of the Talmud can be highly abstract.
The reality that it creates can be far removed from everyday
life. Part of the joy of talmudic study (once one understands the
Aramaic and Hebrew terms) is to find contradictions within the
text and to resolve them, to probe a text for a variety of
possible meanings, and to attempt to create a coherent
structure that harmonizes as many points of view as possible.
The activity can be highly abstract and formal. The Talmud
requires one to deal with problems that no longer arise. For
example, much of the Talmud deals with the ancient Temple,
the animal sacrifices, and the priestly caste.4 A student of the
Talmud cannot avoid these religious concepts by attempting to
study only non-religious law, such as the talmudic law of torts
or crimes, because the religious concepts creep in at various
points. Thus, one encounters questions about the tort liabilities
associated with an animal that has been donated to the
for trials involving the High P r i e ~ t and
T e m ~ l eprocedure
,~
,~ a
host of other matters that might illumine the general area
under study. Indeed, the Talmud devotes attention to the study
of problems that it assumes never or hardly ever arose. For
instance, the tractate Sanhedrin devotes several pages to the
rules applied to the rebellious son, who under biblical law is

'

4. For instance, one of the six orders of the Mishnah is called Kodashim. It
concerns primarily the types of sacrifices that the priests offered in the Temple.
These subjects are also discussed in many other places in the Talmud. For
example, the beginning tractate of the Mishnah, which deals primarily with
blessings, defines the time for reciting part of the evening service by reference to
when priests who had been ritually unclean may begin to eat "terumah," food
which possesses a degree of sanctity. Berakhot 1:l.
5. E.g., BABYLONIAN
TALMUD,Baba Kamma 37b, 53b [hereinafter B.
TALMUD].
6. E.g., B. TALMUD,
Sanhedrin 18a; JERUSALEM
TALMUD,
Sanhedrin 2:l.
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subject to the death penalty.7 The discussion is purely
abstract. No specific cases are mentioned. Indeed, the rabbis
construed the definition of a rebellious son so narrowly that
some of the talmudic rabbis thought there never was and never
would be a n actual case? Why are these formalistic matters
studied? The study of the Torah9-upon which the Talmud is
based-is a religious activity, and like all religious activities, a t
least part of the reward is inherent in the activity itself.'' In
addition, the study of the Torah is a way of experiencing God's
revelation. The Talmud states that a father who teaches his
son the Talmud is regarded as if he had himself stood a t
Sinai." Why? Because the revelation that began a t Sinai
continues and is made manifest whenever the Torah is studied.
The study of the Torah is parallel to prayer, for both involve a
communion with God. l2
I n contrast to the formalism of the study of Jewish law,
Professor Kirschenbaum demonstrates that the resolution of a n
actual dispute is an equitable activity. It is not an abstract
exercise i n reasoning but a practical resolution of a problem.
The goal is to reconcile the parties. According to talmudic law,
lawyers ought to be excluded from the entire trial process.13
This forces the parties to confront one another directly before a
religious tribunal. The goal is not simply to unveil the truth a t
all costs, but to resolve the dispute in a manner that heals the
wounds between the parties and within the cornm~nity.'~
Jewish courts can proceed under the method of strict law or by
the method of compromise if authorized by the parties.
Compromise means that the court will impose a solution that
differs from the requirements of strict law and will respond to

7. B. TALMUD,
Sanhedrin 68b-72a; see Deuteronomy 21:18-21.
Sanhedrin 71a.
8. B. TALMUD,
9. "Torah" refers to the five books of Moses and also to the oral law which
is reflected in part in the Mishnah, Talmud, and later sources.
10. As the Talmud recites in c o ~ e d i o nwith the law of the rebellious son,
'Why then was this law written?-That you may study it and receive reward."
B. TALMUD,
Sanhedrin 71a.
11. See B. TALMUD,
Berakoth 21b.
12. The Talmud teaches that one ought to pray where one studies because
after the destruction of the Temple, God is only found within four cubits of the
Berakoth 8a.
Torah. B. TALMUD,
HALAKHlc PERSPECTIVES,
supm note 2, at 139-40.
13. See KIRSCHENBAUM,
14. Maimonides, physician and codifier, drew the analogy between healing
illness and resolving civil disputes. Id. at 284 (citing MAIMoNIDES, GUIDEOF THE
PERPLEXED
34 (S.Pines ed. & trans., Univ. of Chicago Press 1963)).
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the "equities" and special features of the particular case.15
Unlike the American system of trial, which considers the
adversary system to be the best method for uncovering the
truth, the Jewish system is more dubious about the ability of
witnesses and fact finders to determine what actually
happened. In addition, the Jewish system recognizes that the
dispute over what happened may play only a small part in the
complex relationship between the parties.
Jewish courts strongly encourage parties to authorize the
court to impose a compromise. But even when the parties do
not give that authorization, Jewish law gives the judge some
discretion. When the law or facts are unclear, the rabbi is to
follow his intuition and judgment to seek peace? Even when
the law and facts seem clear, the rabbi has considerable power
to adjust the law to the subtleties of the facts before him."
These and other examples of equity in Jewish law are used by
Professor Kirschenbaum to dispel the misconception that
Jewish law is only a set of formal rules.

JEWISHLAWAND THE IMPLICATIONS
11. VALUESUNDERLYING
OF A RELIGIOUSLEGALSYSTEM
A. Comparing Jewish and American Law: Why Incorporating
Jewish Law into the Law of a Modern State Is Difficult
Professor Kirschenbaum's books discuss whether the values underlying Jewish law differ from those underlying a modern legal system. While there are many similarities in both
systems, there are some h d a m e n t a l differences in their outlook and goals as well. American law, for example, places a
high value on individualism, free enterprise, and privacy. Jewish law, while not always opposed to these goals, has other
aspirations that may cause conflict. Foremost among these
goals is support for the study of the Torah and the maintenance of a religious community committed to mutual support
through acts of loving kindness.18
15. Id. at 137-49.
16. RESPONSA
ROSH107:6.
17. See, e.g., KIRSCHENBAUM,
HALAKHIc PERSPECTIVES,
supra note 2, at 86-108
BEYONDEQUITY,
(coping with improper behavior by litigants); KIRSCHENBAUM,
supm note 2, at 56-57 (some rules are not to be taught in public); id. at 201
(whether a man is obligated to support children born of a civil intermarriage,
which is invalid in !he eyes of Jewish law, depends on the facts and circumstances
of the case).
18. Simon the Just said, "Upon three things the world is based: upon the To-
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The differences between the goals of the two systems surface in a variety of settings. Two areas mentioned by
Kirschenbaum are monopolies and freedom of contract.lg
American law generally views monopolies as an undesirable restraint on trade, and generally favors the notion of freedom of
contract, subject to the prevention of fraud or overreaching. By
contrast, Jewish law generally favored the use of monopolies.20 It also limited the ability of merchants to compete freely. Regulated monopolies were viewed both as a protection to
the community and as a n equitable means of ensuring a merchant's livelihood. For example, communities were authorized to
fix prices for essential c ~ m m o d i t i e s In
. ~ ~the field of contracts,
Jewish law was willing to overturn a fairly negotiated contract
if doing so would conform to the "ways of pleasantness" of the
Torah. Thus, a renter could be compelled to give up his lease if
the owner convinced the court that "his financial situation
[was] such that he [was] compelled to sell his house and that
the buyers [had] made the sale conditional on their immediate
occupancy of the premises."22
From an American legal perspective, monopolies, limitations on competition, and limitations on freedom of contract
impede economic growth and limit individual freedom. But
from a Jewish law perspective, these restrictions were necessary to prevent harm to other members in the community.
They were a natural outgrowth of the religious teachings that
members of the community must help one another.
Another area where the differences between Jewish law
and American law are striking is criminal law. No American
court would try to dissuade an owner of stolen goods from accepting the return of the goods from a repenting thief. The
rah, upon Divine service, and upon acts of loving kindness." MISHNAH,Aboth 1:2
(Herbert Danby trans., 1933). Some of the differences between Jewish law and
American law are explored in Steven F. Friedell, The "Different Voice" in Jewish
Law: Some Parallels to a Feminist Jurisprudence, 67 IND.L.J. 915 (1992).
19. KIRSCHENBAUM,
HALAKHIc PERSPECTIVES,
supra note 2, at 178-80.
ARUKH,Hoshen Mishpat 156:5. But no monopoly could
20. See, e.g., SHULHAN
be had over the teaching of the Torah. Id. at 156:3.
21. Id. at 231:27.
22. KIRSCHENBAUM,
HALAKHIc PERSPECTIVES,
supra note 2, at 172. In the
case referred to, Responsa Radbaz IV, 143, additional facts mitigate somewhat the
seeming harshness of the rule. The lease was not for a fured period, rent was
being paid monthly, and the owner was facing the prospect of going to a Gentile
prison after trial in a Gentile court for debts owing to his Gentile creditors. Imprisonment posed a risk of illness or death. The responsum m'akes no mention of
any hardship to the renter.
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thief's confession and sincere efforts to repent would a t most be
taken into account in reducing the sentence. But the Talmud
teaches that the owner should refuse the return of the stolen
goods.23Although later sources limited the reach of this talmudic rule, its existence suggests that Jewish law and American law have different priorities. Jewish law is a religious system that places a high value on atonement. The rabbis were
concerned that thieves might be prevented from repenting if
restitution meant the loss of all of their possessions.
Given these fundamental differences, it is no surprise that
Jewish law and American law differ over the concept of unjust
enrichment. As shown by Kirschenbaum, American law requires restitution from a defendant who has been unjustly
enriched even if the enrichment caused no tangible loss to the
plaintiff. By contrast, Jewish law requires no restitution in
such cases.24For instance, Jewish law denies restitution t o
the owner of a vacant building if a squatter occupies the building without causing any tangible loss to the owner. In American law, the owner's loss of exclusive right to possession is
.~~
regarded as a loss that entitles the owner to r e ~ t i t u t i o nThe
Jewish approach gives less respect to the individual's right to
ownership and gives more weight to the obligation t o help
others in distress. Unjust enrichment is an open-ended concept.
Not only is the concept of "enrichment" subject to debate, but
the concept of "unjustness" calls on all the policies of the underlying legal system.26Kirschenbaum explores both the American and the Jewish law of unjust enrichment, highlighting
these basic differences in outlook.
Because American and Jewish law have different values,
caution must be used in comparing doctrines in the two legal
systems that appear similar on the surface. A good example is
a two-hundred-year-old case in Jewish law that invites parallels to modern economic theories. As discussed by
Kirschenbaum, there was a dispute between brothers who
owned different floors of a house. One brother wanted to open a
bar on an upper story which he owned. The other brother protested that the bar would create disturbing noise below. A

23. KIRSCHENBAUM,
BEYOND EQUITY,
supm note 2, at 81-83.
24. URSCHENBAUM,
HALAKHIC PERSPECTIVES,
supra note 2, at 231-52.
25. See 1 GEORGE
E . PALMER,
THE LAWOF RESTITUTION
5 2.10 (1978).
26. See Jay M. Feinman, The Law of Restitution, 11 RUT.-CAM.L.J. 689, 696
E. PALMER,THELAWOF R E ~ T I O(1978)).
N
(1980) (reviewing GEORGE
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mishnah apparently gave the protesting brother a solid case; it
allows neighbors t o protest the opening of a shop but not the
But one of the leadopening of a factory within a ~ourtyard.~'
ing authorities of the day, Rabbi Moses Sofer-Schreiber, interpreted this passage to mean that the court must consider the
cost of alternatives. Since a shop can normally be opened on
the street at little cost, the neighbors of the courtyard may
protest. But since a factory can normally be moved only at
great cost, residents may not protest. In the case at hand, Rabbi Sofer found that the cost of renting new space for the bar or
of trying to sell liquor on the street would be prohibitively
expensive. If the owner from the upper story could be enjoined
from opening a bar, then "nobody would ever be able to make a
living.'a8
Kirschenbaum correctly reads Rabbi Sofer's responsum as
showing that Jewish law refuses t o resolve disputes by application of formal rules.29But one could read the case as foreshadowing the modern economic approach that all nuisance disputes ought t o be resolved in the most cost-efficient way.
Kirschenbaum avoids the temptation to do so, and I think such
a reading would be inconsistent with other Jewish values. At
stake for the owner of the upper story was the opportunity "to
make a living," not the opportunity of making a fortune. A
property owner can be forced to tolerate noise if the alternative
is to put someone out of business. But all nuisance cases are
not necessarily to be decided in favor of the most cost-efficient
user. Judaism did not despise wealth; rather, the role of making money was subordinate to the study of the Torah. The real
value of making a living was that it enabled one to study the
Torah or, at least, to support others in their study of it?'

B. "MishpatIvri" Cannot Be Faithfully Incorporated
into the Israeli Legal System
A number of consequences follow from recognizing that
Jewish law differs not only in some incidental matters from a

27. MISHNAH,
Bava Batm 2:3.
28. Responsa Hatam Sofer, HM. 92.
29. KIRSCHENBAUM,
HALAKHIC
PERSPECTIVES,
supra note 2, at 108-10.
30. See B. TALMUD,Berakoth 34b; cf Yehoshua Liebermam, The Coase Theorem in Jewish Law, 10 J. LEGALSTUD. 293, 297 (1981) (the owner of a courtyard
may not protest that there is too much noise from the voices of school children
studying the Torah since the value of Jewish education is very high).
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secular legal system, but also in its fundamental outlook, structure and purpose. One consequence is to recognize the limitations of the modern Israeli approach to the study of Jewish law
known as "mishpat ivri." This modern Hebrew term was coined
to connote those subjects of Jewish law that are relevant to the
There is nothing wrong with
operation of a secular so~iety.~'
focusing on these matters, nor is it wrong to try to incorporate
Jewish law into the legal framework of the State of Israel. But
because the concept of "mishpat ivri" is foreign to Jewish law,
the modern approach is unlikely to present a n accurate picture
of the subjects studied.
First of all, in order to understand many of the terms and
concepts that are implicated in a study of torts, contracts, or
criminal law, one has to see how those terms and concepts are
used within religious settings. A modern student of Jewish law
cannot avoid studying questions like the liability of animals
that have been devoted to the sanctuary or the immunity of the
High Priest. More importantly, one cannot paint an accurate
picture of Jewish law by focusing on the abstract treatment of
portions of the substantive law; one must see how that law was
put into practice. Furthermore, the practice of Jewish law was
intimately tied to the religious courts, the religious belief structures and practices of the communities, and the religious aspirations of the Jewish people.
For example, the prohibition of usury was seen in Jewish
law as a religious problem, not merely a limitation on contract.
As Kirschenbaum demonstrates, Jewish law viewed usury not
as a violation of natural law but as a violation of the requirement of "hesed" or loving kindness that members of the community are expected to show one another.32 A modern court
cannot hope to apply the Jewish rules governing usury without
understanding the underlying religious purposes.
Another instance is the Jewish law concept of "dinei
shamayyim," or laws of heaven. Jewish tort law limited liability rather severely.33One of the escapes from this limited liability was that even though a defendant in some cases would
be exempt under ('dihei adam" or human law, he might be
liable under the laws of heaven. As Kirschenbaum shows, the

31. See "Mishpat Ivri," 12 ENCYCLOPAEDIA
JUDAICA
109 (1972).
BEYONDEQUITY,supra note 2, at 25-44.
32. KIRSCHENBAUM,
33. See Steven F. Friedell, Some Observations on the Talmudic Law of Torts,
15 RUTGERS L.J. 897, 902-08(1984).
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concept of liability under heavenly law could have tangible
effects on earth. A rabbinic court might be able to coax a defendant into fulfilling his religious obligations and i n some cases
might be able to coerce him to do so. Thus, a recalcitrant party
might be barred from qualifying as a witness:4 and a plaintiff
in such cases might be able to resort to self-help.35
How can these concepts be successfully incorporated into a
modern judicial scheme? If a secular court borrows only the
limited liability that is available under human law, it achieves
only superficial success. If it allows the plaintiff to pursue selfhelp, it goes beyond the field of tort law and may well encourage breaches of the peace. If the court disqualifies the defendant from testifying i n other cases, it may undermine the public policies underlying the law of evidence and may unduly
hamper the administration of justice. Successful incorporation
would require a n integration of differing values and purposes,
not merely the rules derived from them.
The field of conflict of laws has given us the concept of
dkpe~age,which is the resolution by a court of different issues
in a case by resort to different legal systems.36 It is doubtful
that simple d6pe~agewould sufficiently mesh Jewish law with
modern legal systems. When a court resorts to d6pegage it runs
the risk of creating a hybrid result that would not be achieved
by either legal system. More than that, the result might be
antithetical to both legal systems. For example, Jewish law
imposes strict liability on individuals for harms directly caused
by their bodies.37 It limits the effect of this liability by having
~ having no rule of joint and
no rule of respondeat ~ u p e r i o r ?by
several liability,3g and by measuring damages in ways that
generally benefit the defendanto4OIf a secular court were to
34. KIRSCHENBAUM,
BEYOND
EQUITY,
supnz note 2, at 158-59.
35. Id. at 151-57.
36. See EUGENE
I?. SCOLES
& PETER HAY,
CONFLICT
OF LAWS 35 (2d ed.
1992).
37. SHULHANARUKH, Hoshen Mishpat 421:3 (liability for damage even in case
of force majeure).
38. See Haim S. Hefetz, Vicarious Liability in Jewish Law, 6 DIN&ISRAEL
49
(1975) (in Hebrew).
ARUKH, Hoshen Mishpat 410:37.
39. SHULHAN
40. According to Jewish law there are five possible types of damages that can
be owed in a case of personal injuries committed by a person: damage, pain, loss
of time, medical care and humiliation. Damage is only owed in case of force majeure. Id. at 421:3. Damage was measured by comparing the loss of value based on
the assumption that the plaintiff was a slave being sold in the market place. Id.
at 420:15. Humiliation is due only in case of intent to cause humiliation. Id. at
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incorporate the Jewish law of strict liability for certain torts
and combine it with the secular doctrines of joint and several
liability, respondeat superior, and liberal damage evaluation,
the court would create a result that could not be reached by
either legal system independently. Further, the result would
also be antithetical to both legal systems. That is, the Jewish
approach of strict liability limited to the individual defendant
achieves a goal of localizing the blame on the individual whose
activity caused the harm. I t lightens the burden by measuring
damages in a way that is generally favorable to the defendant.
But if, in the name of Jewish law, the court were to punish a n
employer for an injury that his employee only partially created,
it might be perverting the values of Jewish law. Similarly, a
secular approach that requires a showing of negligence does so,
in part, to encourage activity that may cause losses but is otherwise beneficial to the economy. However, the application of
strict liability in such a circumstance may be antithetical to
these goals. Thus, applying secular aspects of Jewish law in a
modern legal system would distort the values of both Jewish
law and the modern legal system.
Professor Kirschenbaum's contribution to the study of
Jewish law has been immense, and we are fortunate that these
two books are written in English by a scholar familiar with the
classical and modern analogies. His books persuasively question the notion that Jewish law is all formalism. No fair reader
can ever conclude that Jewish law is oblivious to the consequences of a decision or to the underlying purposes and policies. On the contrary, the books heighten our awareness that
Jewish law has policies and purposes that are unique and that
make the application of Jewish law in a modern legal system
difficult.

421:l. Pain was the amount that a plaintiff would pay to avoid having to undergo
the pain. Id. at 420:16.

